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Natural-philosophical novatores in late seventeenth-century Italy typically endorsed a 
corpuscularist view of principles. They claimed that natural philosophy should identify the 
causes or principles of natural phenomena and they identified those principles either with 
corpuscles, or with motion and matter, which in turn consists of corpuscles. Yet, several 
Italian novatores were also adherents of early modern experimental philosophy, that recent 
studies have portrayed as being incompatible with corpuscularism. This raises the question of 
whether early modern philosophers could consistently endorse both a corpuscularist doctrine 
of principles and the tenets of experimental philosophy. This paper addresses this question by 
examining Domenico Guglielmini’s Philosophical Reflections derived from the Figures of 
Salts (1688).2 In this treatise on crystallography, Guglielmini puts forward a corpuscularist 
theory and he defends it in a way that is in line with the methodological prescriptions, 
epistemological strictures, and preferred argumentative styles of experimental philosophers. 
The examination of the Reflections shows that early modern philosophers could consistently 
endorse, at the same time, both experimental philosophy and a corpuscularist doctrine of 
principles. 
The paper starts by explaining what I understand by experimental philosophy and 
corpuscularism. I then show that a corpuscularist doctrine of principles was widely accepted 
among late seventeenth-century Italian novatores, although most practitioners refrained from 
highlighting it or defending it explicitly. We will then turn to the main corpuscularist claim of 
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the Reflections and its methodological preface, that explicitly endorses experimental 
philosophy. I conclude by discussing how Guglielmini’s adherence to experimental 
philosophy relates to his corpuscularism.  
EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND CORPUSCULARISM 
The movement of early modern experimental philosophy emerged in England around 1660 
amongst fellows of the early Royal Society like Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke. It quickly 
spread to Italy, where it found a favourable reception among the naturalists and physicians 
who regarded themselves as Galileans.3 It even influenced those Jesuits, like Daniello Bartoli 
and Filippo Buonanni, who were willing to integrate new insights in an eclectic version of 
Aristotelian-Scholastic scientia and to engage with novatores on the specific details of their 
discoveries (e.g., Bartoli 1677: 5–18), rather than rejecting their outlook a priori for its 
metaphysical and theological implications (Torrini 1979b: 20–27). Among other works, 
Geminiano Montanari’s Physico-Mathematical Thoughts (1667) and Francesco Redi’s 
Experiments on the Generation of Insects (1996 [1668]) endorse central tenets of 
experimental philosophy. 
Experimental philosophers shared a common rhetoric, based on the praise of experiments 
and the criticism of hypotheses and speculations. They had common heroes, like Bacon, and 
common foes, especially Aristotelian and, later, Cartesian natural philosophers. But their most 
important common trait lies in their views on how we can acquire and expand our knowledge 
of nature. Experimental philosophers held that, before firmly committing oneself to any 
substantive claims or theories of the natural world, one should gather extensive empirical 
information by means of experiments and observations. They assigned the same primary role 
to experiments and observations (Anstey 2014: 105–106): identifying matters of fact which 
are the basis for developing and confirming theories on the natural world. Experiences (that 
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is, experiments and observations) reported by others must be critically evaluated and, if 
possible, their experiments must be replicated. Only once this process of fact gathering and 
checking is nearing completion, will we be entitled to commit firmly to substantive claims or 
theories (Hooke 1705a: 18), and only insofar as they are warranted by experiments and 
observations (Boyle 1999 [1662]: 12; Sprat 1667: 107).  
Seventeenth-century experimental philosophers often claimed that empirical information 
should be organized in experimental natural histories (Oldroyd 1987: 151–152): large 
structured collections of experiments and observations on any kinds of items (biological 
kinds, minerals, diseases, states of matter, counties, and arts). These collections should serve 
as the preliminary step to the construction of “a Solid and Useful Philosophy.”4 Natural 
philosophical theories should be derived from empirical information through a process called 
induction (Glanvill 1668: 87; Hooke 1705b: 331; Montanari 1980: 540) or deduction (Newton 
1999 [1726]: 943). Yet, seventeenth-century experimental philosophers did not take up 
Bacon’s theory of induction,5 nor did they develop detailed accounts of how theories can be 
derived from experiments and observations.6  
These methodological and epistemological views of seventeenth-century experimental 
philosophers entail neither the endorsement, nor the rejection of corpuscularism. I understand 
corpuscularism as a view on explanatory natural-philosophical principles, namely, the view 
that physical phenomena should be explained in terms of the shape, size, and spatial 
arrangement of the particles that make up physical bodies, along with the motion of such 
particles according to the laws of nature.7 Yet, several recent studies on early modern 
experimental philosophy distinguish sharply between experimental philosophy and 
corpuscularism. According to Luciano Boschiero and Marta Cavazza, experimental 
philosophy was a “purely descriptive” endeavour, “programmatically disinterested” in the 
“metaphysical causes” of natural phenomena (Cavazza 1998) and independent from 
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“theoretical convictions,” “presuppositions and preconceptions” (Boschiero 2007: 1, 9).8 
Corpuscularism did not merely describe phenomena, but sought to explain them in terms of 
causal processes involving unobserved, metaphysically basic entities. For Stephen Gaukroger, 
on the other hand, experimental philosophy was not purely descriptive. It provided “non-
reductive explanations” that avoid any mention of corpuscles (Gaukroger 2006: 254), “as 
opposed” to corpuscularist attempts to explain phenomena “in terms of some underlying 
micro-corpuscular structure” (Gaukroger 2014: 28). According to Alan Chalmers, 
corpuscularist explanations aimed to identify the “rock-bottom or ultimate causes of material 
phenomena.” The explanations of experimental philosophers singled out non-ultimate, 
intermediate causes, as “opposed to accounts of the ultimate structure of matter” (Chalmers 
2012: 551). 
The view that experimental philosophy and corpuscularism were sharply distinct and, 
possibly, in conflict with each other underlies several studies of the authors who committed 
themselves to both, like Robert Boyle and several Italian natural philosophers. To what degree 
Boyle’s experimental science depends on his corpuscularism is a matter of controversy,9 as is 
the view that Boyle suspended his commitment to corpuscularism when articulating his 
experimental philosophy (Gaukroger 2014: 19). Yet, it is generally agreed that Boyle’s 
“theoretical reflections on the corpuscular hypothesis” belong to his “speculative theory,” as 
opposed to his experimental philosophy.10 This divide between experimental philosophy and 
corpuscularism has been portrayed as being so deep that some Italian natural philosophers 
allegedly endorsed experimental philosophy to conceal their corpuscularism. According to 
Luciano Boschiero, the members of the Florentine Accademia del Cimento portrayed 
themselves as experimental philosophers to hide their allegiances to competing Aristotelian 
and corpuscularist matter theories.11 And for Marta Cavazza (1990: 145), Bolognese authors 
followed the model of English experimental philosophers to downplay their matter-theoretical 
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commitments and preserve the freedom of teaching “in the ideological framework of the 
Catholic Counter-Reformation.” According to Cavazza, it is by presenting themselves as 
experimental philosophers, rather than corpuscularists, that Bolognese practitioners avoided 
the charges of atheism raised against Neapolitan novatores (Torrini 1979a) and the conflicts 
that led to the imposition of Aristotelianism as the sole natural philosophy to be taught in 
Florence (Galluzzi 1974, 1995).  
This paper provides a different perspective on the relation between experimental 
philosophy and corpuscularism by focusing on Domenico Guglielmini’s Philosophical 
Reflections derived from the Figures of Salts (1688). In this work, Guglielmini commits 
himself to experimental philosophy as well as corpuscularism. He does not treat these 
commitments as opposed or competing with one another. The work is not divided into a 
speculative disquisition about corpuscles on the one hand, and metaphysically neutral 
experimental reports on the other. Instead, Guglielmini relies on premises and arguments that 
conform to the epistemological and methodological strictures of experimental philosophy in 
order to develop corpuscularist explanations. This work shows that at least one early modern 
experimental philosopher could and did consistently entertain corpuscularist views.12 
Corpuscularist explanations were not necessarily in contrast with experimental philosophy, 
nor did they always belong to the realm of speculation. 
NATURAL PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES IN LATE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY 
ITALY 
Corpuscularism was a widely held view among late seventeenth-century Italian novatores. 
They did not provide any explicit, detailed discussions of principles, however, a survey of 
their texts reveals a broad agreement on two claims. The first is that natural philosophers 
should not stop at “experimenting, and narrating,” as the proem to the Cimento’s Saggi 
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states,13 but they should also search for the causes or principles of natural phenomena.14 The 
second claim is that these principles are neither the traditional four elements, nor the 
Paracelsian tria prima, nor water, as Van Helmont had claimed. They are either corpuscles, or 
motion and matter, which in turn consists of corpuscles.15 For instance, Giuseppe Valletta 
states that, for modern philosophers, corpuscles “are the first principles of all material 
things.”16 Donato Rossetti (1667: 14) claims that the “Democritean principles,” that is, 
“corpuscles and atoms,” are necessary to explain natural phenomena. He divides atoms into 
dark and bright and he calls both types of atoms principles (Rossetti 1671: 1). Rossetti’s 
adversary, Geminiano Montanari, officially denies that we are already able to establish 
whether corpuscles are “first principles” (Montanari 1980: 547). In his view, we will 
conclusively identify the first principles only once we have charted all of their effects (540). 
Yet, it is telling that, having surveyed a variety of opinions on whether the true principles are 
those of the Presocratics, Democritus’ atoms and vacuum, Plato’s matter and ideas, or 
Aristotle’s matter, form, and privation, Montanari ignores all those theories except 
Democritus’, and goes on to discuss “corpuscles, that is, atoms.”17  
Perhaps the most instructive example of how widespread the adoption of corpuscularist 
principles was among Italian novatores is provided by Francesco Redi. At first sight, he might 
appear to provide a nice illustration of the discontinuity between experimental philosophy and 
corpuscularism. He is often portrayed as the prototype of a “superficial” style of inquiry 
(Baldini 1980: 427) that focuses on “macroscopic and behavioral features of animal species” 
(Bernardi 1996 [1668]: 7) and eschews any “hypotheses on the basic structure of phenomena” 
(Baldini 1980: 450). There is good reason to believe that this approach was motivated, at least 
in part, by Redi’s concern to avoid conflicts with the Aristotelians and the Church. Those 
conflicts might have endangered not only his privileged position in the Medici court, but also 
the freedom of teaching and research of Florentine novatores. Redi was instrumental in 
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dissuading Rossetti from publishing the Polista fedele, a work on the compatibility of 
corpuscularism with the Catholic faith, whose appearance would have raised the ire of the 
traditionalists (Gómez López 2011: 231). Yet, in an anonymous text, Redi was quick to 
declare that “the truly natural principles” of the sensible world are atoms or corpuscles.18  
Despite these endorsements, corpuscularism was far from being universally accepted, 
undisputed, or uncontroversial in late seventeenth-century Italy. It was a distinctive view of 
natural philosophical novatores. Traditionalist Aristotelian philosophers and Church 
authorities rejected it on several grounds. Their most vocal objections were theological, 
especially those concerning the incompatibility of corpuscularism with the dogma of 
transubstantiation (see e.g., Borrelli 1995b: 13–50). These objections were the ground for 
charges of atheism and smear campaigns. In Naples, these were followed by trials. More 
broadly, traditionalist Aristotelians perceived corpuscularism as subverting the entire edifice 
of scientia (Torrini 1979: 18–20), along with the positions of cultural and political power to 
which they saw Aristotelianism as being subservient. As the Aristotelian Giovanni Maffei 
(1995 [1670]: 1327) candidly stated, Aristotelianism was “more useful than any other 
[doctrine] to the attainment of those ends to which the monarchs of the earth aspire.” 
Although corpuscularism was a controversial natural philosophical view, the authors who 
defended it most vocally, Francesco D’Andrea (1995 [1685]) and Giuseppe Valletta (1975 
[1691–1697]), were not primarily natural philosophers, but lawyers. If we look at the most 
significant contributions to natural philosophy and medicine that were published by Italian 
authors––including Lorenzo Bellini, Domenico Guglielmini, Marcello Malpighi, Alessandro 
Marchetti, Geminiano Montanari, and Francesco Redi––we can easily identify corpuscularist 
assumptions underlying specific arguments or entire theories (see e.g., Baldini 1977: 11–12). 
Yet, none of those authors published any explicit, extended development of a corpuscularist 
matter theory or a defense of corpuscularist principles.19 
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This might be explained in two ways. In the first place, one might note that, in the light of 
Galileo’s condemnation and given the hostility of Church authorities, the most effective 
strategy for spreading corpuscularism was not to publish explicit defenses of its principles or 
replies to the attacks of the Aristotelians. It was to publish descriptions and explanations of 
specific natural phenomena that presupposed corpuscularist principles, sometimes even 
mentioned them in passing, but did not emphasize them (Vasoli 1979: 205–206). When the 
Aristotelians––even the most progressive ones––engaged with the novatores on specific 
empirical questions, unprejudiced readers could often see that the empirical evidence 
weighted on the side of the novatores.20 These could hope that an increasing acceptance of 
their explicit empirical results would pave the way for the acceptance of their implicit 
corpuscularism. In the second place, one might claim that the most prominent natural-
philosophical novatores did not provide any explicit defense of corpuscularist principles 
because they were incompatible with the adherence to experimental philosophy that was key 
to their successes. In what follows, we will see that Guglielmini provides a counterexample to 
the latter claim. 
Before we turn to Guglielmini’s views, it is worth acknowledging that not all 
corpuscularists were adherents of experimental philosophy. Tommaso Cornelio held that 
natural philosophers should not start by carrying out experiments and observations, but by 
formulating hypotheses and axioms (Cornelio 1688: 78–81). Rossetti held that, before turning 
to experiments and observations, natural philosophers should develop a theory of nature as a 
whole (Rossetti 1669: 11). Giovanni Alfonso Borelli, a key member of the Accademia del 
Cimento and the author of a seminal work on biomechanics, relied on a priori arguments to 
show that certain animals cannot move in given ways because they are not sufficiently simple, 
economical, or conducive to the achievement of natural purposes (Borelli 1680–1681, 1: 266–
267). Unlike Cornelio, Rossetti, and Borelli, several corpuscularists openly endorsed 
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experimental philosophy. Among them is Domenico Guglielmini.  
GUGLIELMINI’S PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS DERIVED FROM THE 
FIGURES OF SALTS 
Domenico Guglielmini was a Bolognese natural philosopher and physician whose most 
notable contributions lie in the fields of crystallography (1688, 1719 [1705]) and fluid 
mechanics (1697; see Maffioli 2002). He presents his Reflections as a discourse that was read 
in Bologna, at a meeting of a “philosophical-experimental academy”21 in the tradition of the 
Accademia del Cimento and the Royal Society. Despite their brevity, the Reflections are one 
of the most significant seventeenth-century works on crystals.22 They reflect his practice with 
the procedure for obtaining salt crystals,23 his familiarity with the views of the Aristotelians, 
Descartes (whom he often criticizes24), “the most famous Boyle,”25 and others on what 
determines the shape of crystals, and his knowledge of Antoni van Leeuwenhoek’s (1687: 
119–148) microscopic observations of Cyprus vitriol and tartrate floating in water, published 
only one year before the Reflections.  
In 1669, Nicholas Steno had highlighted the difference between the regular figures of 
crystals and the irregular figures of petrified living things. He proposed that quartz crystals 
“grow through the deposit of layers parallel to their surfaces” (Gohau 2002: 835). He also 
spelt out, with more precision than his predecessors, what the uniformity of their shapes 
amounts to. Their angles have always the same measure, whereas the relative length of their 
facets can change.26 With this proposal, Steno anticipated the law of constancy of interfacial 
angles, that Jean-Baptiste Romé de l’Isle would generalize and confirm in 1783.27  
Guglielmini’s Reflections address the issue of what determines the constancy of interfacial 
angles. Aristotelians could explain it by appealing to substantial forms. Boyle had denied that 
it is necessary to appeal to substantial forms to account for the figures of “alum, vitriol, and 
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other salts, that are so curiously and geometrically shaped.” “[T]hese bodies themselves may 
receive their shape from the coalition of such singly invisible corpuscles” and from the way in 
which they “are determin’d to stick together.”28  
Boyle’s comments on the figures of the corpuscles of specific crystals were 
characteristically cautious (Burke 1966: 32), unlike Descartes’ and Hooke’s. In the 
Meteorology, Descartes had claimed that, “since we observe salt grains to be square, they 
must be made up of oblong shaped particles arranged side by side, to form a square.”29 As 
Helen Hattab notes, “[t]his is fairly typical of Cartesian explanations,” many of which are 
“hasty inferences from observed effects to the supposed geometrical properties and 
arrangements of unobservable material particles.”30 Unlike Descartes, Hooke (1665: 85–86) 
supposed that the particles of all crystals may be spherical and that the combination of spheres 
of different sizes determines the variation in the shapes of crystals.  
In the Reflections, Guglielmini (1688: 18) extends the constancy of interfacial angles from 
macroscopic crystals to their smallest constituent corpuscles, that is, minima. Guglielmini 
argues that the minima of salts have the same interfacial angles as the crystals that they 
compose. The minima of common salt are cubes, those of vitriol rhombohedra, those of nitre 
hexagonal prisms, and those of alum tetrahedra.31  
This claim provides the basis for Guglielmini’s explanation of why all instances of the 
same crystal have the same interfacial angles. This is not due to their substantial forms, nor 
does it depend on which acids can be found in the crystals (1688: 20–21). It is due to the fact 
that the visible instances of any given salt are combinations of minima which are tightly 
stacked together and which have the same interfacial angles of the salt that they compose. The 
Reflections fall squarely within the tradition of corpuscular philosophy: they argue for a claim 
concerning corpuscles and they employ it to account for the properties of macroscopic 
objects. 
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FOUR METHODS 
Guglielmini prefaces his corpuscularist arguments with a discussion of four natural 
philosophical methods and a clear-cut endorsement of the method of experimental 
philosophy. He begins by criticizing traditional philosophers. Instead of starting the study of 
nature by observing specific natural phenomena, they endorse certain general principles and 
derive propositions on specific phenomena from them. Yet, experience shows that their 
conclusions are false. This is because they rely on principles whose truth is dubious (3).  
Hypothetical philosophers seek to avoid the error of traditional philosophers by starting 
their inquiries from experience.32 Having observed certain phenomena: 
 
they formulate a hypothesis on the constitution and nature of principles, which is suitable 
to explain [rendere ragione] effects that are ordinarily observed. They claim [pretendono] 
that the agreement of the supposed principles with observations is a sufficient 
demonstrative proof of the hypothesis. (4) 
 
Their assumption is mistaken because alternative hypotheses can explain the same empirical 
facts equally well. Guglielmini shows this by using the familiar example of alternative 
astronomical systems. If they are to provide persuasive explanations, philosophers should not 
rush to devise hypotheses for any given phenomenon. They should first gather extensive 
observations. Although Guglielmini does not mention any hypothetical philosophers, 
Descartes’ argument on the figure of salt provides a good example of their way of proceeding 
and experimental philosophers had often contrasted Descartes’ premature reliance on 
hypotheses with their reliance on experience. As a consequence, Guglielmini’s readers could 
hardly fail to read the passage as a criticism of Descartes and his disciples.33  
Superficial philosophers make a mistake opposite to that of hypothetical philosophers. 
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They gather a large amount of observations on natural phenomena, but they refrain from 
identifying their causes. Although their efforts are commendable, they are not authentic 
natural philosophers, because natural philosophy is a search for the causes of phenomena (6–
7). Maurizio Mamiani (1987: 248) holds that superficial philosophy “is certainly the method 
of natural history, with an old tradition, recently renewed by Boyle.” Yet, far from turning his 
back on causal inquiries, Boyle conceived of experimental natural history as a preliminary to 
the search for causes. Guglielmini was certainly aware of this. He is more likely to have 
identified superficial philosophers with ancient and Renaissance natural historians, like Ulisse 
Aldrovandi, or with the superficial style of natural philosophical inquiry of Francesco Redi 
and his disciples. 
According to Guglielmini (1688: 8), natural philosophers should collect a large number of 
“replicated and well-regulated” experiments and organize them in a “natural history,” that will 
provide “a solid and necessary foundation” for identifying the “causes” of “nature’s 
operations” (7–8).34 This method “provided the opportunity for the establishment of many 
famous academies” (7) in England, Italy, and elsewhere. It is the method of experimental 
philosophy, as it was described at beginning of this paper. Guglielmini states that it is the 
method of his exposition in the Reflections.35 This indicates that he views the Reflections as a 
work that conforms to the dictates of experimental philosophy. 
EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND CORPUSCULARISM 
To see if the Reflections really conform to the dictates of experimental philosophy, we should 
focus on two issues: whether the organization of the work is in line with the methodological 
precepts of experimental philosophy, as Guglielmini states, and whether its contents conform 
to the epistemic strictures of this movement. As for the organization of the Reflections, they 
do not contain a proper experimental natural history of salts. However, they do have a two-
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part structure which broadly conforms to the preferred methodology of experimental 
philosophers: first, they provide a description of given phenomena, and then they put forward 
explanations. After the methodological preface (1–9), Guglielmini devotes several pages to 
the description of the figures of five types of salts (9–17). This is followed by an explanatory 
section that extends the constancy of interfacial angles to corpuscles, relies on it to account 
for the figures of salts, and refutes alternative accounts (17–33).  
As regards their contents, the Reflections will conform to the epistemic strictures of 
experimental philosophy if they adhere to the prescription that any firm commitment to 
substantive claims or theories must be justified by experiments and observations. Guglielmini 
establishes his claim on the figures of corpuscles both positively, by providing three 
arguments for it, and negatively, by responding to objections that may be raised against his 
view and refuting alternative accounts of the figures of salts. 
The first argument establishes its conclusion by means of an inference from a feature of 
visible crystals to a feature of the minima. Guglielmini invites his readers to observe: 
 
that all visible crystals of the same salt, whether big or small, have the same figure, so 
that the arrangement of their parts is independent from the greater or smaller quantity of 
their matter; indeed, one can observe that the efflorescences of nitre on walls … are 
arranged in very subtle rows which have the same figure that is displayed by its crystals. 
 
He then infers that: 
 
the salts that our senses cannot perceive, too, will have the same figure … by applying the 
same reasoning to the smallest parts, we will know that the ultimate parts of matter, that 
is, those that no natural agent can divide into smaller particles, have a given figure.36 
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The reasoning that underpins this inference is an analogical reasoning. This raises the 
question of whether Guglielmini holds that analogical reasoning presupposes a priori 
principles. Analogical reasoning is a close relative of induction and one of Guglielmini’s 
correspondents, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, held that induction can only be warranted by 
substantive a priori principles.37 If Guglielmini held that analogical reasoning presupposes 
any such principles, his first argument on the minima of salts would rely not only on 
observations and experiments, but also on substantive a priori truths. If so, one might worry 
that Guglielmini’s reliance on a priori truths is in contrast with the professed reliance of 
experimental philosophy on experiments and observations alone. 
In response, it should be noted that there is no evidence for the view that Guglielmini took 
analogical reasoning to rely on a priori assumptions. As far as I am aware, neither 
Guglielmini, nor those of his peers who wrote extended methodological discussions, like 
Giorgio Baglivi and Marcello Malpighi, discuss whether the foundations of analogical 
reasoning are empirical or non-empirical. 
The comments of Giuseppe Antonio Barbari and Giorgio Baglivi on analogical reasoning 
are telling in this regard. Barbari is a little known author who, like Guglielmini, studied in 
Bologna under Montanari and who published a treatise on vision. Its preface discusses 
analogical inferences from the macroscopic domain to the sub-microscopic domain in some 
detail. Barbari (1678: vii–xi) discusses their degree of reliability, their potential pitfalls, and 
their psychological basis, which he takes to be innate. Yet, he does not even raise the question 
of whether analogical inferences presuppose non-empirical assumptions. The same holds for 
Baglivi, who devotes an entire chapter of The Practice of Physick (1696: Bk. I, Ch. 6) to 
analogical reasoning. He praises its usefulness, sets limits to its employment, and defends the 
legitimacy of the analogies employed by mechanist philosophers and physicians. Yet, he does 
not discuss their empirical or non-empirical basis. As far as I know, this issue was not on the 
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table for seventeenth-century Italian novatores. Nor is there any reason to believe that 
Guglielmini took his recourse to analogy to presuppose non-empirical truths. 
Guglielmini’s employment of analogical reasoning to establish a claim about corpuscles 
might raise another worry. This is whether Chalmers’ objections against Boyle’s analogical 
arguments concerning corpuscles apply to Guglielmini’s argument. Chalmers notes that one 
of Boyle’s arguments applies the law of fall to corpuscles and ascribes weight to them. Yet, 
corpuscles have only fundamental, mechanical qualities or affections. Boyle does not include 
weight among them, nor does he explain how weight might derive from the properties or 
collisions of corpuscles (Chalmers 1993: 549). Boyle’s other arguments explain features of 
body by means of analogies between the behavior of the corpuscles that compose them and 
that of strands of fleece, clocks, or watches. Yet, Boyle fails to account for “the elasticity” of 
the fleece and “the spring and the rigidity of the gear wheels” in terms of “the shapes, size, 
motions and arrangement of corpuscles” (550). 
Chalmer’s objections against Boyle do not apply to Guglielmini. This is because, unlike 
Boyle’s analogical arguments, Guglielmini’s argument does not ascribe to corpuscles 
properties like gravity, weight, rigidity, and elasticity, that he fails to explain in terms of the 
fundamental properties of corpuscles. The only properties that Guglielmini’s argument 
ascribes to corpuscles are shapes and figures. These were routinely included in early modern 
lists of basic, primary qualities, including Guglielmini’s own list. In his view, shape and size 
are the only fundamental, intrinsic qualities of all material bodies (Guglielmini 1719a: 466, 
468). 
While Guglielmini’s first argument does not raise concerns, the second argument is more 
problematic: 
 
When we separate some salt from water, the parts of salt are ordered in such a way that 
they form an exquisite figure. What can we imagine that could bring about such figures? 
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Nothing else than the inclination of the planes of their smallest parts. Since they all have 
the same inclinations, as they gradually and orderly join each other, the size will grow, 
but the figure will not change. (Guglielmini 1688: 18–19) 
 
This argument is problematic because, rather than resembling the argumentative style of 
experimental philosophers, it recalls the all-too-quick flight of hypothetical philosophers from 
experience to theories. Guglielmini notes an empirical fact. He sketches a corpuscular story 
that accounts for it. He claims that the story provides the only explanation for the fact. Instead 
of pausing to justify on this claim, he takes it as established that the explanation must be 
accepted.38  
It is hard to believe that Guglielmini could have given much weight to this argument. This 
is because he was well aware that his corpuscular story does not provide the only explanation 
for that empirical fact. Just one page later (20–21), he discusses and then refutes an alternative 
explanation, according to which the shape of salts is due to “the spirit, or volatile acid that 
predominates in the salts” (20). In the light of this, the second argument is best seen as a brief 
rhetorical parenthesis between the first and the third arguments. These carry the real 
argumentative weight of Guglielmini’s view. They aim to establish that his explanation is not 
the only possible explanation of the facts, but the best and most probable explanation. Like 
many of his Italian peers, Guglielmini holds that natural philosophical theories can attain only 
probability, not certainty.39 
The experiences on which his third argument relies are the microscopic observations 
reported by Leeuwenhoek in his Anatomia seu interiora rerum (1687: 122–126). Guglielmini 
states that Leeuwenhoek saw the fact mentioned at the beginning of the second argument. 
Specifically, he saw that particles of vitriol and tartrate floating in water have the same 
interfacial angles of their macroscopic conglomerates (19). Leeuwenhoek also reported that 
he saw the particles of salts increasing in size, while maintaining the same figure. This 
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provides further evidence for the scale invariance of the figures of salts on which the first 
argument relies.  
Experimental philosophers stressed the importance of first-person experience and the 
necessity of verifying the testimony of others whenever possible. In the light of this, it may 
seem surprising that Guglielmini appeals to Leeuwenhoek’s testimony, instead of providing 
first-person reports of those observations. Guglielmini was skilled in the use of the 
microscope. He had learned it from his teachers Geminiano Montanari and Marcello 
Malpighi, both accomplished microscopists.40 Presumably, he too observed the crystals of 
tartrate floating in water under a microscope, as Leeuwenhoek had done.  
Two remarks help explain Guglielmini’s reference to Leeuwenhoek’s observations. In the 
first place, as Steven Shapin (1994) has stressed, experimental philosophers relied on a 
significant extent on “borrow’d Observation[s]” of “Authors not to be distrusted.”41 Boyle 
(2000 [1690–1691]) approves the reliance of experimental philosophers on the testimony of 
“Shepherds, Plowmen, Smiths, Fowlers, &c.,” who “are conversant with the Works of 
Nature” (313), and the reliance of “the most rational physicians” on the testimony of their 
patients and earlier physicians.42 In the eyes of Guglielmini and his peers, Leeuwenhoek was 
a trustworthy source of information. Although, occasionally, accomplished experimentalists 
reacted with caution to some of Leeuwenhoek’s observations,43 by 1688 he had established a 
strong reputation. He had published no less than twenty-seven articles in the Philosophical 
Transactions,44 two volumes in Latin, and he had been elected Fellow of the Royal Society. In 
the light of this, even though Guglielmini probably replicated Leeuwenhoek’s observations, 
noting that Leeuwenhoek had carried them out might have helped lend plausibility to them. 
In the second place, Guglielmini’s use of Leeuwenhoek’s observations to establish a 
conclusion concerning minima was in line with the assumptions and expectations of many 
novatores. Bacon had related the use of the microscope to the vision of minima as early as 
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1620 (2004 [1620]: Part II, § 39). He stated that, “if Democritus had seen” a microscope, “he 
would perhaps have leaped for joy, thinking a way was now discovered of discerning the 
atom.” In 1664, Henry Power claimed that microscopes allow us to see “the very Atoms and 
their reputed Indivisibles and least realities of Matter.”45 Newton’s Opticks, first published in 
1704, sixteen years after Guglielmini’s Reflections, states that microscopes will allow us to 
see at least the largest particles, perhaps even most of them (Newton 1730: 236–237). 
Giuseppe Gazola, a promoter of experimental philosophy who, like Guglielmini, studied with 
Montanari, states in a posthumous discourse that microscopes enable “modern physicians” to 
see “the figure of the smallest [menome] particles that make up compound bodies” (Gazola 
1716: 172–173). Guglielmini does not state that the particles seen by Leeuwenhoek are 
themselves minima.46 However, his appeal to microscopic observations to defend a 
conclusion about minima is in line with the view, widely shared by novatores, that there is no 
radical discontinuity between the minima and those corpuscles that can be observed with the 
microscope. 
Guglielmini’s reference to Leeuwenhoek’s observations is especially interesting because 
some of them may appear to disprove Guglielmini’s views. Guglielmini holds that the minima 
of alum are square pyramids with adjacent bases, so as to form octahedra. In his later, 
systematic treatise on crystals (1719 [1705]: §xxi), Guglielmini refers to Leeuwenhoek’s 
observations in order to establish this claim. Yet, as the Reflections note in passing and his 
systematic treatise explains (1719 [1705]: §xxiii), Leeuwenhoek describes “the figures of 
alum as being mostly hexagonal,” rather than octahedral. Guglielmini confirms that, “[u]sing 
the microscope, one can really see them as having a hexagonal, sometimes even pentagonal 
shape.” 
Guglielmini explains the apparent hexagonal or pentagonal shape of alum by noting that, in 
the salts observed with a microscope, “the distance between the opposed sides is minimal” 
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and their “transparency, even if it may be low, cancels completely the effects of distance 
itself.” As a result, what is actually an octahedron can appear as a hexagon or pentagon. 
Consider two adjacent minima of alum, which form an octahedron. If its depth is not 
perceived, then, depending on the observer’s position, it may appear as a square, a rhombus or 
a hexagon, as can be seen from Figure 1. A single minimum of alum, which has the shape of a 
square pyramid, may appear as a square, a pentagon, or a triangle, as can be seen from 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1: The three figures on the top row are octahedra in different positions. If 
their depth is not perceived, they may appear like the square, hexagon, and 
rhombus on the bottom row. 
 
Figure 2: The three figures on the top row are tetrahedra in different positions. If 
their depth is not perceived, they may appear like the square, pentagon, and 
triangle on the bottom row. 
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Guglielmini’s explanation of the observations by Leeuwenhoek that appear to disprove his 
view exemplifies the kind of “genuine empirical support” for corpuscularism that, according 
to Alan Chalmers, Boyle never provided. Chalmers writes: 
 
It is conceivable that genuine empirical support for the corpuscular hypothesis could be 
arrived at by (a) appealing to some phenomena to determine something about the shapes, 
sizes and motions of corpuscles and then (b) to employ those characteristics to explain or 
predict other phenomena, but I am not aware that Boyle achieved any successes of that 
kind. (Chalmers 1993: 553, letters added) 
 
Guglielmini (a) appeals to phenomena concerning the macroscopic crystal of salts to 
determine the figures of their corpuscles. In particular, he determines that the corpuscles of 
alum, when combined two by two, have an octahedral figure. Leeuwenhoek observed, to 
employ Chalmers’ words, “other phenomena” (the apparent hexagonal figures of alum) that 
Guglielmini’s theory does not account for. Guglielmini (b) explains those phenomena by 
combining his claim that paired corpuscles of alum have an octahedral figure with the remark 
that microscopic observations of salts do not reveal their depth. 
This pattern of argument conforms to Bacon’s recommendation to ascend and then descend 
“a double scale or ladder:”47 “to extract … from works and experiments causes and axioms, 
and in turn from causes and axioms new works and experiments” (Bacon 2004 [1620]: Bk. I, 
§ 117). Guglielmini ascends from phenomena concerning salts to their material cause, which 
is the figure of their corpuscles, and then descends from those causes to the explanation of 
Leeuwenhoek’s observations.48 
Having made a positive case for his claim on the figures of corpuscles, Guglielmini replies 
to objections and criticizes alternative accounts of what determines the figure of given salts. 
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He thoroughly discusses a series of objections concerning alum. Some of them are empirical, 
whereas others are a priori. Guglielmini does not hesitate to provide a priori replies to the a 
priori objections, but he combines them with empirical remarks. Consider, for instance, the 
following objection. Visible crystals of alum appear to have the shape of an octahedron. Yet, 
it is hard to see how one could form an octahedron by combining smaller octahedra 
(Guglielmini 1688: 22–23). This is an a priori, geometrical worry. Guglielmini replies that an 
octahedron can derive from the combination of two tetrahedra (square pyramids) with 
adjacent bases. He proposes that the minima of alum are not octahedra, but tetrahedra, and 
that each octahedral crystal of alum is made up of twelve tetrahedra. He explains how they 
must be arranged to form an octahedron. 
This reply may recall Descartes’ “hasty inferences” from given explananda “to the 
supposed geometrical properties and arrangements of unobservable material particles” (Hattab 
2011: 73). Yet, in contrast to Descartes, Guglielmini rushes to back up his proposal that the 
crystals of alum are tetrahedral with observations. For instance, he observes that: 
 
in the crystals formed by solutions of tartrate, mixed with alum, one can see that the 
figures of alum are composed by other, similar figures, for one can see that the surface of 
one of the superficial triangles [i.e. tetrahedra] is composed by many other triangles 
[tetrahedra] of the same nature, even though, sometimes, one of those triangles protrudes 
a bit on the outside. This happens because the matter of tartrate entered between those 
parts of alum and, when it hardened, it separated them from one another. (Guglielmini 
1688: 23–24) 
 
Guglielmini’s recourse to a geometrical model to explain the disposition of salt crystals is 
consistent with the tenets of experimental philosophy, even if geometrical reasoning may be 
seen as a form of a priori reasoning. This is because experimental philosophers were not 
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averse to a priori reasoning as such, but to non-empirical justifications of claims on the 
natural world. Guglielmini establishes the correctness of his geometrical model by means of 
observations. He then discusses three objections. He answers each of them with arguments 
based on his experiments and observations (24–30). This way of proceeding is in line with his 
later claim that “the number and figure” of the angles of salt particles cannot be “contrived in 
one’s mind or established a priori,” but must be derived “from experiments and observations” 
(1719 [1705]: §xv). 
In sum, Guglielmini’s Reflections is a corpuscularist treatise whose methodological preface 
explicitly endorses experimental philosophy. Guglielmini does not endorse experimental 
philosophy to conceal or downplay his corpuscularist commitments. He does not portray 
experimental philosophy as being merely descriptive, uninterested in the causes of 
phenomena, or independent from theoretical claims on the existence and the properties of 
corpuscles. On the contrary, the Reflections is explicitly devoted to establishing a claim about 
the figures of the most basic corpuscles and constituents of salts, their minima.49 This claim is 
not relegated to a speculative section of the work, as distinct from an experimental or natural 
historical section. On the contrary, the structure of Guglielmini’s corpuscularist treatise 
conforms to the two-step method that experimental philosophers favoured. With the exception 
of his second argument, that plays a merely rhetoric role, Guglielmini’s positive arguments on 
the figures of corpuscles and his replies to objections conform to the desideratum of 
experimental philosophers that any substantive claim on the natural world be based on 
experiments or observations. Even his response to an a priori, geometrical objection is not 
limited to a priori considerations, but is backed up by observations. Guglielmini’s Reflections 
shows that corpuscularist theories can be in line with the methodological prescriptions, 
epistemological strictures, and preferred argumentative styles of experimental philosophers. 
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10
 Anstey and Hunter 2008: 96. According to Anstey (2011: 4–5), corpuscularism was “legitimate […] 
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speculative philosophy. On the experimental/speculative distinction in seventeenth-century England, 
see Anstey 2005. 
11
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as components of matter; D’Andrea’s (1995 [1685]) defense of corpuscularism and his claim that “it is 
unnecessary to introduce any other principles within nature than matter and motion” (D’Andrea 1995 
[1673–1675?]: 151); Bianchini 1785 [c.1687]: 7–8 on body and motion as “mechanical principles” and 
14 on corpuscles as components of body. 
16
 Valletta 1975 [1691–1697]: 49. Valletta calls them atoms and uses “atom” as a synonym of 
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 Anon. 1698. On the authorship of this text, see Bernardi online, http://www.francescoredi.it/ 
Database/redi/redi.nsf/b4604a8b566ce010c125684d00471e00/db89f5de884dcab0c12569fa005f0a14 
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http://www.webcitation.org/6VM1torcv). 
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 A significant exception is Donato Rossetti, who developed and published a rather detailed 
corpuscularist theory. He “admitted defeat” in the bitter dispute on corpuscularism that took place in 
Pisa in the early 1670s by leaving the city and taking up a position in Turin as Court mathematician 
(Bernardi online, 
http://www.francescoredi.it/Database/redi/redi.nsf/b4604a8b566ce010c125684d00471e00/805e5cf3a5
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them. 
20
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Redi and the Jesuit Filippo Buonanni concerning spontaneous generation. 
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 Guglielmini 1688, frontispiece. On this academy, see Cavazza 1990: 51–56. 
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Guglielmini’s definition of salt, see his 1719 [1705]: § iii–v. 
23
 He obtained them by incinerating or calcining a substance containing salts, boiling the ash or calx in 
water, filtering it repeatedly with felt, and making it evaporate slowly until, after a few days, crystals 
appear on the bottom and the side of the container. If the crystals are dissolved in water, the process 
can be repeated multiple times. Crystals appear every time and their interfacial angles have always 
have the same measure. See Guglielmini 1688: 10–11. 
24
 See for example, Guglielmini 1688: 11 and 1719 [1705]: 76 on the figure of the particles of nitre; 
1719 [1705]: 74 on Descartes’ doctrine of the three elements; 1719 [1705]: § vii on the infinite 
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(see e.g., Cornelio’s letter De cognatione aeris et aquae, written in 1649, in Cornelio 1688: 387). 
Montanari read Descartes’ natural philosophical works in 1657–1658 (Rotta 1971: 153n97). Redi 
asked a correspondent to purchase all of Descartes’ works for him in 1665 (Bernardi online, 
http://www.francescoredi.it/Database/redi/redi.nsf/b4604a8b566ce010c125684d00471e00/51931bc 
b175458c6c12569fb0051b3d1, archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6VOGOCvac). 
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 Guglielmini 1688: 28. 
26
 Steno 1669: “Explicatio Figurarum,” trans. in Steno 1916: 272. 
27
 The law, in Romé de L’Isle’s formulation, states that the faces of crystals of the same species “can 
vary in their shape and in their relative dimensions, but the respective inclination of the same faces is 
constant and invariable in each species” (Maitte 2013: 6). 
28
 Boyle 1999 [1672]: 29; see Boyle 1999 [1666–1667]: 368. Eighteenth-century authors would put 
forward several other views on what determined the figures of crystals. According to William 
Homberg, “the figures belonged to the alkalis rather than to the acids.” Which figure a crystal took 
depended on which alkali “it had crystallized” (Burke 1966: 25). For to Johann G. Wallerius, “salt 
itself possessed no crystalline figure before it combined with something metallic” and “the figure of a 
mineral crystal was due to its metallic ingredients” (26). Torbern Bergman held that “the external 
configuration of salts depended upon the joint combination of acid and alkali” (27). 
29
 Hattab 2011: 73; see Descartes 1965 [1637]: 256–260, trans. in Descartes 1965: 280–283; Hattab 
2009: 126–135. 
30
 Hattab 2011: 73. This is not to deny that some of Descartes’ observations were meticulous, or that 
he was aware of the different roles that experiments can play. Yet, Descartes’ outlook on natural 
philosophical explanations accords a secondary roles to experiments and observations. See Roux 
2013: 52–54. 
31
 Guglielmini holds that the minima of alum are typically paired two by two, so as to give rise to 
octahedra. Guglielmini’s De Salibus (1719 [1705]: § xvii) identifies four basic, simple crystals. This 
view is not present in the earlier Reflections. 
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32
 This label, like the others in this section, is mine. Guglielmini calls the method of these philosophers 
“philosophizing through hypotheses” (1688: 4–5). 
33
 Mamiani (1987: 248) noted this. 
34
 As was customary for experimental philosophers, Guglielmini assigns to both experiments and 
observations the role of identifying the matters of fact that provide the basis for theorizing. In a 
posthumous treatise, Guglielmini explains that natural philosophers should aim to ascend gradually 
from immediate to more remote causes, until they have explained all properties of bodies in terms of 
their essential, fundamental properties, namely shape and size. It does not pertain to natural 
philosophers to explain why bodies have these essential properties and not others. See Guglielmini 
1719a: 467. 
35
 Guglielmini 1688: 8. His later treatise on salt, instead, follows the “synthetic” method of exposition 
(1719 [1705]: 81). 
36
 Guglielmini 1688: 18. Guglielmini defends the view that there are such ultimate parts of matter 
against Descartes in his 1719 [1705]: § vii. Like Boyle (1999 [1666–1667]: 325–326), Guglielmini 
(1719a: 468) holds that God can divide those particles. 
37
 See Leibniz 1966 [1670]: 432, trans. in Leibniz 1969: 130. For Guglielmini’s correspondence with 
Leibniz, see Cavazza 1987. 
38
 This pattern of reasoning was explicitly endorsed by Descartes, to whom Guglielmini’s criticism of 
hypothetical philosophers alludes. See Descartes 1971 [1644]: Part 4, § 1. 
39
 Guglielmini 1697, “A’ benigni lettori”; see e.g., Rossetti 1669: 12; Montanari 1671: 15; Borelli 
1680–1681, 2: 57, 72–73; Di Capua 1681: 164 –165; Bianchini 1785 [ca.1687]: 17. 
40
 Montanari reported microscopic observations in his works (e.g., Montanari 1667: 12). He used to 
build microscopes and grind lenses. Malpighi used the microscope systematically to observe animals 
and plants since the 1660s. 
41
 Boyle 1999 [1661], 190. 
42
 Boyle 2000 [1690–1691]: 308. See also the example of Columbus at p. 214. 
43
 See for example, Redi’s reaction to Leeuwenhoek’s observation of spermatozoa, as reported in 
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Bernardi online, 
http://www.francescoredi.it/database/redi/redi.nsf/b4604a8b566ce010c125684d00471e00/ 
fec5577faaaa81c0c12569fb0051ead8 (archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6VM1zGVFk). 
44
 See Anderson online, 
http://lensonleeuwenhoek.net/category/bibliography/Philosophical Transactions (archived at 
http://www.webcitation.org/6VM26YMtz). 
45
 Power 1664: Preface, sig. b2. Power is more cautious at p. 155. 
46
 A few decades later, Jacopo Riccati (1762: 542) would emphatically deny it. 
47
 Bacon 2000 [1605]: 50. Guglielmini’s Italian peers knew and employed this image. See e.g., Lana 
Terzi 1977 [1670]: 52. 
48
 The same argumentative pattern is found in Montanari’s works. They often proceed from 
explanations to theories, derive predictions from those theories, and then confirm those predictions 
empirically (e.g., Montanari 1715 [1678]: 89). For a methodological statement, see Montanari 1980: 
550. 
49
 There is a significant difference between Guglielmini and Boyle in this regard. Guglielmini, like the 
Paracelsians, appears to have held that the “first,” most basic components or particles of salts are 
themselves particles of salts (Guglielmini 1688: 30; 1719 [1705]: §§vii, viii, xviii). Boyle (2000 
[1679]: 33), instead, held that “the first Saline Concretions that were produc’d by Nature” are “made 
of Atoms, or of Particles, that before their conjunction, were not Saline.” Boyle (1999 [1661]: 105–
106) took his experiment on the redintegration of nitre to show this. While Guglielmini knew Boyle’s 
essay on nitre, I do not know how he interpreted Boyle’s experiment. On a more general level, 
Guglielmini’s matter theory distinguishes between three layers, just like Boyle’s: elements, which 
have only basic properties like shape and size, are indivisible by natural powers, and all composed by 
the same matter; their compounds, i.e. molecules; and macroscopic bodies (Guglielmini 1719a: 467, 
468). On Boyle’s multi-layered theory and its relation to Paracelsus’ theory, see Newman’s chapter in 
this volume. 
